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Efficiency in Pre-Merger and Post-
Merger Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
Andrew C. Worthington∗ 
School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Queensland, Australia 
A two-part process is employed to analyse the role of efficiency in merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity in Australian credit unions during the period 1993 to 1997. The measures of 
efficiency are derived using the nonparametric technique of data envelopment analysis. The 
first part uses panel data in the probit model to relate pure technical efficiency, along with 
other managerial, regulatory and financial factors, to the probability of merger activity, 
either as an acquiring or acquired entity. The results indicate that loan portfolio 
diversification, management ability, earnings and asset size are a significant influence on the 
probability of acquisition, though the primary determinant of being acquired is smaller asset 
size. The second part uses a tobit model adapted to a panel framework to analyse post-
merger efficiency. Mergers appear to have improved both pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency in the credit union industry.  
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During the last two decades, sweeping changes to the restrictions governing deposit-taking 
institutions (DTI) around the globe have been made. Financial service providers who 
previously operated within well-defined, regulatory sub-sectors have been forced to adapt to 
newly deregulated environments. And to some extent, the most discernible response by the 
financial services industry to the concomitant increase in competition has been an increase in 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. In turn, the wave of M&As has placed an emphasis 
on the efficiency implications of DTI mergers. Berger et al. (1993, p. 232) justifies the 
interest of policy-makers and other concerned parties in this process as follows:  
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If these mergers are successful in improving banking industry efficiency, substantial 
benefits may accrue to the customers and claimholders of these banks, and the level of 
competition within the banking industry may be considerably increased. Moreover, the 
efficiency effect of mergers constitutes an important policy question on its own, since 
merger applicants often cite prospective efficiency benefits as a justification for merger 
approval. 
However, when examining existing research in the area of financial institution merger 
efficiencies, a number of salient points emerge. First, while bank merger efficiencies have 
been extensively studied, primarily in the context of US financial institutions [see, for 
instance, Rhoades (1993), Shaffer (1993), Elyasiani et al. (1994) and Grabowski et al. 
(1995)], relatively little attention has been paid to measuring the post-merger efficiency of 
non-bank financial institutions or banks outside the US. Berger et al. (1999, p. 180) use these 
shortcomings to direct future research in this area:  
Most of the empirical research on financial services consolidation has focused on US 
banking organisations, and much of this has used data from the 1980s or early 1990s that 
may not well represent the consolidation of the future. We suggest that future studies focus 
on recent data from many nations [and] …should put additional emphasis on the effects of 
M&As of non-bank financial institutions. 
Second, even when studies have concerned themselves with this area [for exceptions see 
Thompson (1997), Fried et al. (1999) and Garden and Ralston (1999)], little is known about 
the pattern of efficiency in pre-merger firms and whether these characteristics are taken into 
account in the merger process. This is despite the fact that the pattern of financial institution 
mergers is acknowledged to reflect an industry-wide drive for greater operational economies, 
and the application of regulatory incentives to promote efficiency and stability within the 
financial system. Third, Berger et al. (1993, p. 235) has also called for further research to 
determine the factors that predict efficiency gains or losses: “for policy purposes, it is 
important to know the factors that predict efficiency benefits, given that market participants 
often claim such benefits when applying for regulatory approval”. Finally, Berger et al. 
(1999, p. 181) has also directed the form future empirical work in this area should take: 
“future research should more often employ dynamic analysis methods that evaluate the 
consequences of consolidation by comparing the behaviour of financial institutions before and 
after M&As or by comparing the behaviour of recently consolidated institutions with other 
institutions”. It is with these considerations in mind that the present study is undertaken. 
The selection of Australian credit unions for this purpose is appropriate for a number of 
reasons. First, in the period following the major Australian Financial System (Campbell) 
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Inquiry (1981) recommendations, credit unions, along with all other DTIs, were forced to 
adapt to a newly deregulated environment. As discussed, these invariably increased the pace 
of M&A activity. However, the pressures for consolidation have been particularly 
pronounced in the Australian credit union industry.1 In evidence, mergers account almost 
entirely for the twenty-three percent decline in the number of individual credit unions 
operating over the period 1992 to 1997. There is currently no single study concerning the 
pattern of both pre-merger and post-merger efficiency in these institutions. 
Second, existing empirical evidence suggests that the motives for mergers in co-operative 
deposit-taking institutions vary substantially from those found in, say, commercial banks. One 
aspect of this process is that an individual member can acquire only one vote regardless of the 
value of funds committed, and that credit unions cannot acquire shares in another. Hostile 
acquisition is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Accordingly, there is the 
suggestion that structural change in co-operative financial services is essentially restricted to 
‘friendly’ mergers, and that there is a large degree of acquiescence by regulatory authorities 
in this matter. Furthermore, it is also the case that liquidation of Australian credit unions has 
been extremely rare, and it is widely understood that the exit of a credit union in financial 
distress is likely to occur through merger rather than liquidation (Brown et al., 1999). The 
impact of these differences on non-bank financial institution merger activity and post-merger 
efficiency gains remains as yet unquantified. 
Third, the regulatory environment within which Australian co-operative deposit-taking 
institutions operate appears to have played an indirect role in fostering merger activity. 
Beginning with the Australian Financial Institutions Act 1992 and later an amended Banking 
Act 1959 [as recommended in the Financial System (Wallis Committee) (1997) Inquiry] all 
banks, building societies and credit unions are now regulated by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) as a single class of ‘authorised deposit-taking institutions’. It 
has, for example, been suggested that the prudential standards on liquidity, capital and 
lending in credit unions have highlighted merger as a means of increasing capital base and 
improving efficiency (Davis, 1994).  
It is important to note, however, that regulatory control on deposit-taking institution 
merger activity in Australia is almost always indirect. ‘Forced’ mergers are virtually 
unknown. Though APRA may issue a direction to an institution that fails to comply with a 
prudential standard, and this could feasibly result in the appointment of a statutory manager 
who then could arrange a merger, these direction powers are rarely used and then only as a 
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last resort (APRA, 2000). Nevertheless, while conceivably all credit union mergers in 
Australia are ‘unassisted’ they, as noted by Fried et al. (1999, p. 372) in the US context, 
“…typically run the gamut from ‘encouraged’ to completely voluntary”. 
Finally, while it is generally accepted that a credit union’s overriding objective is 
maximisation of member benefits, there is evidence that the objectives of Australian credit 
unions have increasingly been shaped by management towards profit-maximisation. The most 
obvious reason is that decisions by management with respect to member services are made in 
the context of a highly competitive financial sector (Garden and Ralston, 1999). Moreover, 
there is the suggestion that this reorientation of credit union objectives has facilitated the 
merger process in recent years. However, in spite of the erosion of the traditional objectives 
of credit unions, there is still an emphasis on the common bond or affinity that defines 
membership. For example, credit unions in Australia are restricted to three categories: 
namely, industrial (employee) groups; community-based (geographic) groups; and parish 
(religious) groups. Although there has been a considerable weakening of these bonds, it also 
suggest that more immediate concerns in finding a merger partner may be consideration of 
consistency of purpose and geographic location, as against more commercial motives. There 
is a compelling case for the analysis of such factors in the Australian institutional milieu. 
Accordingly, the analysis of efficiency as a motive for and outcome of merger activity in 
cooperative deposit-taking institutions is likely to involve the complex interaction of a large 
number of factors. Furthermore, it is likely that these motives have changed substantially 
during the recent program of financial reform. Three characterisations of the merger process 
are likely. One possible characterisation is that the merger process in Australia reflects the 
reorientation of credit unions services towards profit-maximisation, and is therefore 
predominately driven by managerial objectives. Thompson (1997, p. 39) has argued that this 
mechanism is comparable to that provided by the market for corporate control in the joint 
stock sector, which “works to eliminate underperforming mutuals and transfer their assets to 
other societies within the sector”.  
A second characterisation is that the merger process reflects direct intervention by 
regulators to promote efficiency and stability within the financial system. Moreover, 
regulatory constraints placed upon credit unions may highlight mergers as a means of 
increasing operative efficiency in an increasingly competitive financial services industry.2 A 
final characterisation is that notwithstanding the commercial and regulatory imperatives 
discussed earlier, the notion of a bond of association may exert a strong influence on merger 
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activity, and thereby on post-merger efficiency gains. A careful analysis of these divergent 
forces should therefore add to our knowledge about the factors determining the pattern of 
structural change in Australia financial services, and provide at least some idea of the 
effectiveness of recent microeconomic reform, especially in regard to some of the smaller 
deposit-taking institutions.  
In this paper an attempt is made to examine efficiency both as a determinant and outcome 
of merger activity in Australian credit unions. The paper itself is divided into three main 
sections. The second section deals with the specification of those variables posited to 
influence the recent pattern of post-deregulation mergers and with the derivation of measures 
of pre-merger and post-merger efficiency. The third section presents the empirical results of 
the analysis. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks in the final section. 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The data used in this study consists of annual observations of Australian credit unions. All 
data is sourced from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and its 
predecessor, the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC). The data is from 
financial statements submitted by credit unions to APRA for the purpose of prudential 
supervision. For the aim of analysing pre-merger and post-merger efficiency in Australian 
credit unions the available sample is divided into two periods. These are: (i) a pre-merger 
period, when the determinants of M&A activity are examined, and  (ii) a post-merger period, 
when the efficiency outcomes of these mergers are examined. The pre-merger time period is 
taken as the financial years 1993 to 1995, and the post-merger time-period is 1996 to 1997.3  
Of course, the total number of credit unions in operation and the number of merging credit 
unions vary over these periods. For example, of the 323 credit unions in operation in 1993, 17 
credit unions ‘acquired’ 19 credit unions during 1994, leaving 304 institutions at the end of 
the year. In 1995, 14 credit unions ‘acquired’ 14 other credit unions leaving 290 credit unions. 
Finally, 7 credit unions merged in 1996 and 12 in 1997. A more extensive set of time-series 
data would be more valuable. Unfortunately, a national framework for prudential supervision 
of non-bank deposit-taking institutions (along with the requisite database) was only 
established with the creation of AFIC in 1992.  
Two separate approaches are taken to analyse the pattern of efficiency in pre-merger and 
post-merger credit unions. Both are regression-based. First, probit analysis is used to 
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determine the impact of efficiency, as a proxy for managerial ability, on the probability of 
M&A in the period 1993 to 1995. Secondly, tobit analysis is used in the period 1996 to 1997 
to measure the impact of merger on the level of efficiency.4 To start with, an unbalanced 
panel data probit model is used to analyse the factors that influence merger activity in credit 
unions. The advantage of this form is that it allows for both cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the determinants of mergers and allows the use of data where the number of 
cross-sections vary from year-to-year. Firm-level identifiers link cross-sections in different 
years. In any given year, a credit union has two possible outcomes: (i) merge with another 
credit union, either as an ‘acquiring’ or ‘acquired’ party; and (ii) maintain the status quo. 
Since we would expect the subsets of merging credit unions to have distinct characteristics, 
two separate models are estimated, one for ‘acquiring’ credit unions and one for ‘acquired’ 
credit unions. ‘Acquiring’ credit unions are defined as those that subsequently incorporated 
another credit union’s assets, while ‘acquired’ credit unions are subsequently incorporated 
into another credit union. Hence the following model is estimated:   
otherwise 0 and 0 if 1 *1
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where the probability of occurrence of the dependent variable (which takes the value of unity 
if the ith credit union acquired or was acquired in the subsequent year, t + 1, and zero 
otherwise), is thought to depend on a set of financial, managerial and regulatory factors x in 
the current year, t, β is a set of parameters to be estimated, β = β /σv Var[uit + vit] = Var[εit] ∼ 
N[0,σ2], Corr[εit +εis] = ρ = σ2u /(σ2u +σ2v), and  TtNi ,...,1  and ,...,1 == . 
The explanatory variables contained in x are defined in Table 1. Descriptive statistics are 
provided for acquiring and acquired credit unions and for credit unions that neither acquired 
nor were acquired in the period. The first set of variables represent various aspects of firm 
performance and are structured in accordance with a CAMEL (capital structure, asset quality, 
management ability, earnings and liquidity) classification system.5 Each type of ratio provides 
a means of measuring a particular aspect of credit union performance or risk, with the 
exception of management ability. Normally, assessed by regulators on a range of non-
quantitative criteria, management ability in this instance is proxied using nonparametric 
measures of efficiency. Descriptive statistics for the variables other than management ability 
(CAP to AST) are in the bottom part of Table 1, while the inputs and outputs used to provide 
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the measure of efficiency as a proxy for management ability (PTE) are in the top part (PL to 
NIX). The derivation of PTE is discussed following the other measures of credit union 
performance and risk.  
Table 1. Inputs, outputs and explanatory variable descriptive statistics (1993–1995) 
  Non-merging 
credit unions 
Acquiring credit 
unions 
Acquired credit 
unions 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation
PL Personal loans 14557.40 25749.59 31404.75 33508.47 2770.19 5449.01
CL Commercial loans 1017.44 3011.93 867.60 1636.15 159.73 551.45
RL Residential loans 14270.59 29748.03 25836.54 25677.49 2517.57 8310.64
INV Investments 7729.51 14311.22 14195.45 13677.27 1379.71 2814.29
IY Interest income 3529.37 6109.03 7335.55 7657.14 650.25 1487.98
NIY Non-interest income 326.91 809.39 541.84 609.23 54.97 156.07
PHY Physical capital 903.52 2182.23 1635.37 2445.66 164.15 507.06
AC At-call deposits 15686.28 32478.52 28496.09 30211.88 2708.02 7028.06
NW Notice-of-withdrawal deposits 2243.24 8511.59 3149.21 5106.38 373.51 1180.75
FT Fixed term deposits 18011.55 33378.68 36888.23 36740.90 3173.25 7295.32
IX Interest expense 1710.86 3112.33 3414.38 3540.58 275.17 591.31
NIX Non-interest expense 1750.49 3016.19 3720.62 3813.95 401.94 998.64
CAP Reserves/Total assets 0.0588 0.0476 0.0480 0.0321 0.0725 0.0462
DDX Doubtful debts expense/Total loans 0.0039 0.0084 0.0171 0.0111 0.0447 0.0539
HRF Herfindahl index of loan concentration 0.6880 0.2233 0.5513 0.1031 0.9027 0.1866
PTE Pure technical efficiency 0.9115 0.1112 0.9848 0.0315 0.8895 0.0464
NIL Net interest income/Total loans 0.0577 0.1578 0.0680 0.0173 0.0782 0.0416
TEX Total expense/Total income 0.0637 0.0918 0.0642 0.0355 0.0457 0.0735
LIQ Prime liquid assets/Total assets 0.2317 0.1304 0.1756 0.0588 0.2969 0.1450
CDP Call deposits/Total deposits 0.4776 0.2035 0.4218 0.1217 0.6217 0.2688
AST Total assets (in logarithms) 1.0243 0.8237 1.6879 0.4639 0.1153 0.8101
Notes: Inputs and outputs in thousands of Australian dollars. Distribution of credit unions by associational 
bond (1993, 1994 and 1995): Community-based (COM) – 117, 110, 104; Industrial-based – 192, 183, 178; 
Parish-based – 15, 11, 8. The means and standard deviations are calculated using pooled data. 
The first set of variables discussed relate to capital structure, asset quality, earnings and 
liquidity as determinants of M&A. The first variable relates to the role of capital structure 
(CAP) in determining the likelihood of merger or acquisition in credit unions. Capital is of 
particular concern in depository financial institutions of this type because of their low net 
worth and highly leveraged nature, which creates a potential for failure should there be a 
sudden withdrawal of deposits. The measure of capital within each institution is defined as the 
ratio of reserves (including permanent share capital, asset revaluations and retained earnings) 
to total assets. All other things being equal, an acquired (acquiring) credit union should have a 
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relatively lower (higher) level of capital (Berger et al., 1999). A negative coefficient is 
hypothesised for acquired credit unions and a positive coefficient for acquiring credit unions.  
The second variable relates to the asset management activities of each credit union. Asset 
quality measures are concerned with assessing the default or credit risk of the loan portfolio, 
as well as the allocation of the asset portfolio between liquid investments and loans. One 
measure used is the ratio of doubtful debts expense to total loans (DDX). The ex ante sign on 
this coefficient is thought to be positive (negative) for acquired (acquiring) credit unions, 
reflecting in part the extent of asset diversification and the impact of asset risk on merger 
activity. An additional variable is included to measure the extent of asset diversification in the 
loan portfolio: namely, a Herfindahl index of loan concentration (HRF). This measure takes a 
value between zero and unity, with a higher value indicating a relatively less-diversified loan 
portfolio. Berger et al. (1999) provide evidence that acquiring banks bid more for targets 
when the M&A would lead to significant diversification gains and that diversifying M&As 
may also improve efficiency through expanding the skill sets of managers. Given this focus 
on diversification, it is posited that a credit union with a relatively undiversified (diversified) 
loan portfolio will be more (less) likely to be acquired and less (more) likely to acquire 
another institution.  
The next two variables in Table 1 relate to credit union profitability; namely, the ratio of 
net interest income to total loans (NIL) and the ratio of total expense to total income (TEX). 
The second measure is particularly pertinent in that it indicates the operational risk of the 
institution, that is, the possibility that the costs of operating the institution will exceed its 
revenues, thereby depleting equity capital. A negative relationship is thought to exist between 
profitability and acquired credit unions and a positive relationship for acquiring credit unions.  
The sixth variable is a measure of liquidity, defined as the ratio of prime liquid assets to 
total assets (LIQ). Insufficient liquidity to meet demand for deposit withdrawals is identified 
as a key source of depository financial institution risk, and thereby the likelihood that merger 
activity will be used as a means of managing such risk. The final variable is also a measure of 
liquidity; that is, the ratio of call deposits to total deposits (CDP). Potential calls on demand 
deposits expose depository institutions to sudden liquidity crises, call deposits to total 
deposits provides a measure of this exposure. The variables used to represent various aspects 
of credit union performance are comparable to those employed by Thompson (1997) in an 
analysis of mergers in UK building societies, and Ralston (1998) in an Australian credit union 
financial distress model. For both measures of liquidity, a negative (positive) coefficient is 
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thought to exist ex ante for acquired (acquiring) institutions. Lastly, a variable indicating the 
total assets (AST) of each credit union (in logs) is also included. Abundant evidence already 
exists that a significant determinant of M&A activity in financial institutions is size. A 
positive (negative) coefficient is hypothesised for acquiring (acquired) credit unions.  
In addition to these quantitative variables, a qualitative variable is also included in the 
regression. This relates to the associational bond under which each credit union is created: 
that is, community, industrial or parish-based. All other things being equal, a community-
based credit union (COM) will have a more diversified membership than an industrial or 
parish-based one, and may have less resistance by its members to a merger. While these 
institutional divisions are rapidly eroding, the usual implication is that the prospects for 
finding an appropriate merger partner are higher for community-based credit unions. The ex 
ante sign on the dummy variable is thought to be positive for both acquiring and acquired 
credit unions.  
The final variable included in the regression relates to management ability vis-à-vis 
efficiency. The method used to measure efficiency in these credit unions is based upon data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), a mathematical programming approach to frontier estimation 
pioneered in Charnes et al. (1978) and extended in Banker et al., (1984).6 Suitable 
introductions to DEA may be found in Coelli et al. (1997) and Cooper et al. (2000). 
Measuring efficiency in this manner is consistent with both the recent literature associated 
with the efficiency analysis of deposit-taking institutions in general, including Elyasiani et al., 
(1994), Favero and Papi (1995), Miller and Noulas (1996), and with a large number of past 
empirical approaches to efficiency measurement in non-bank financial institutions, notably 
Piesse and Townsend (1995), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) and Worthington (1998; 
1999; 2000). Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a comprehensive survey of the various 
approaches to efficiency measurement in financial institutions.  
The computational procedure used to implement the DEA approach to efficiency 
measurement is presented briefly as follows. Consider N credit unions each producing M 
different outputs using K different inputs in a particular time period. The K×N input matrix, X, 
and the M×N output matrix, Y, represent the data of all N credit unions, while for the 
individual credit union these are represented by the vectors xi and yi. The efficiency of each 
credit union can be determined from the solution to the following linear program: 
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where yi is the vector of outputs produced by the ith credit union, xi is the vector of inputs 
used by the ith credit union, i runs from 1 to N, and j equals 1, 2, ..., N, θ is a scalar and λ is a 
N×1 vector of constants. The value of θ will be the technical efficiency score for a particular 
credit union. It will satisfy θ ≤ 1, with a value of 1 indicating a point on the frontier, and 
hence a technically efficient credit union. The value of θ ≤ 1 identifies the amount of any 
inefficiencies that may be present.  
The model specified in (2) has an assumption of constant returns-to-scale and is only 
appropriate where all credit unions are operating at an optimal scale. Where this assumption 
does not hold, scale effects will confound the measures of technical efficiency. Generally, 
regulatory, geographical and institutional constraints imply that most credit unions are not 
operating at an optimal scale. Following Banker et al. (1984) the linear programming problem 
can be modified to account for variable returns-to-scale (that is, measures of technical efficiency 
without scale efficiency effects) by adding the convexity constraint N1′λ = 1 to (2). The 
measure of technical efficiency obtained without the convexity constraint (that is, under an 
assumption of constant returns-to-scale) is referred to as overall technical efficiency. The 
measure obtained including the convexity constraint (that is, assuming variable returns-to-scale) 
is known as pure technical efficiency (PTE). Dividing overall technical efficiency by pure 
technical efficiency yields a measure of scale efficiency (SCE).  
In this program, emphasis is placed on the equiproportionate reduction of inputs. An input 
orientation is adopted since it is assumed that capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are 
likely to restrict the level of output in any time period. Hence, a suitable behavioural objective 
for these institutions would be that of input minimisation, rather than output maximisation. 
The input measures thus provided can then detect failures to minimise inputs resulting from 
discretionary power and incomplete monitoring, and thereby provide an indication of possible 
gains from exploiting technical efficiencies. Other efficiency studies that employ an input-
orientated approach include Worthington’s (1998) analysis of Australian credit unions and 
Drake and Weyman-Jones’ (1996) study of UK building societies.  
The inputs and outputs employed in the DEA approach are detailed in the upper part of 
Table 1 (in thousands of Australian dollars), and follow the intermediation approach to 
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modelling financial institution behaviour. In this approach credit unions combine physical 
capital (PHY), at call deposits (AC), notice-of-withdrawal deposits (NW) and fixed term 
deposits (FT), along with interest (IX) and non-interest expenses (NIX), to produce personal 
loans (PL), commercial loans (CL) residential loans (RL), investments (INV), interest (IY) and 
non-interest income (NIY). In terms of specific studies, the approach is most consistent with 
the value-added intermediation approach used by Berg et al. (1993), Favero and Papi (1995) 
and Fried et al. (1996). A single variable is subsequently defined for the probit analysis in (1). 
This is an index measure of pure technical efficiency (PTE). Pure technical efficiency (PTE) 
is used since overall technical efficiency includes scale efficiency, and therefore is likely to 
reflect circumstances that are largely beyond managerial control. All other things being equal, 
an acquired (acquiring) credit union is expected to be relatively less (more) pure technically 
efficient than an acquiring (acquired) credit union. Put differently, managerial ability is 
thought to be higher in acquiring credit unions than acquired credit unions. A negative 
(positive) coefficient is expected for acquired (acquiring) credit unions. 
The second part of the procedure used to analyse efficiency in Australian credit unions 
involves the specification of a set of explanatory variables presumed to account for post-
merger efficiency in the period 1996 to 1997. Summary statistics for these variables are 
detailed in Table 2. Once again, the inputs and outputs need for the DEA measures of 
efficiency are in the upper portion of the table and the explanatory variables are in the bottom 
part. Also included are descriptive statistics relating to the measures of pure technical and 
scale efficiency specified as dependent variables. An unbalanced panel data tobit model is 
used to analyse the factors that influence post-merger efficiency in co-operative deposit-
taking institutions as follows: 
1 if 
1 if 1
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where y is an efficiency score (either pure technical or scale efficiency) for the ith credit 
union in the tth time-period, x is a set of explanatory variables posited to explain the presence 
of efficiency in credit unions, β are parameters to be estimated, Var[uit +vit] = σ2u +σ2v = 
Var[εit] ∼ N[0,σ2] and TtNi ,...,1 and ,...,1 == . In this approach, the efficiency of each credit 
union is expected to depend on a set of institutional characteristics and financial measures that 
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characterise its operations. Aly et al. (1990), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992), and Fried, 
Lovell and Vanden Eeckaut (1993), amongst others, have also used nonparametric techniques 
to measure efficiency in financial institutions, followed by parametric techniques to explain 
variation in efficiency. 
Table 2 details the inputs and outputs (in thousands of dollars) used to obtain measures of 
pure technical (PTE) and scale (SCE) efficiency over the sample period. The approach used to 
calculate these measures is identical to the measures of efficiency derived in the pre-merger 
period. Table 2 also includes details on the explanatory variables that relate to firm-specific 
operational characteristics. The first variable, the proportion of non-interest income to interest 
plus non-interest income (NNT), relates to an important aspect of credit union financial 
management. This measure is considered especially important given that one focus of 
deregulation was that “the pricing of banking services ... reflect more closely the user pays 
principle, thus creating incentives for efficiency improvements” (Financial System Inquiry 
1997: 610). However, given the fact that their underlying commitments may not be related to 
specific balance sheet magnitudes, it is somewhat difficult to postulate the relationship 
between non-interest revenue sources and firm efficiency. A positive coefficient is 
hypothesised when efficiency is regressed upon this measure. 
The next two variables are intended to measure whether efforts by credit unions to improve 
the level of post-merger competitiveness and dynamic efficiency are reflected in relatively 
higher levels of efficiency. These are the proportion of total expenses derived from 
expenditures on information technology (INF) and the proportion of total expenses associated 
with expenditures on marketing and promotion (MKT). All other things being equal, it is 
hypothesised that credit unions that have invested heavily in information technology and 
product development should be relatively more efficient in the production of the dollar 
outputs of loans and other financial assets: positive coefficients are hypothesised on both 
counts. 
Two variables are also used to explain how credit union efficiency relates to the 
composition and performance of the loan portfolio: (i) the proportion of residential and 
property loans in the total portfolio (REL) and (ii) the proportion of commercial and business 
loans in the total loan portfolio (COL). One argument here is that a clear ‘market-orientation’ 
in regards to commercial and residential loans may be associated with a relatively more 
efficient credit union (Mester, 1993). In addition, we could also expect that credit unions 
which are exposed to the strong competitive forces in residential and commercial loan 
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markets are obliged to undertake programs aimed at enhancing efficiency. The ex ante signs 
on the coefficients for commercial and residential loans are thought to be positive. 
 
Table 2. Inputs, outputs, dependent and explanatory variable descriptive statistics 
(1996–1997) 
  Non-merged credit unions Merged credit unions 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
PL Personal loans 17762.94 32453.89 43167.06 44718.54
CL Commercial loans 1343.14 3747.85 2315.84 2379.63
RL Residential loans 21901.74 50146.64 39302.72 36866.71
INV Investments 9268.36 16888.32 19511.43 19818.35
IY Interest income 4628.66 8771.63 10202.31 10349.14
NIY Non-interest income 513.62 1310.28 1027.98 1070.56
PHY Physical capital 1122.63 2904.46 2093.58 2377.80
AC At-call deposits 21337.28 44817.31 44038.46 43320.58
FT Fixed term deposits 24024.60 46161.52 49727.32 44620.03
IX Interest expense 2215.51 4501.59 4531.25 4382.70
NIX Non-interest expense 2394.58 4480.38 5637.72 5899.36
PTE Pure technical efficiency 0.9481 0.0787 0.9648 0.0417
SCE Scale efficiency 0.8977 0.0982 0.9338 0.0769
NNT Non-interest income/Total income 0.0706 0.0928 0.0896 0.0460
INF Information expenses/Total expenses 0.0453 0.0327 0.0428 0.0153
MKT Marketing expenses/Total expenses 0.0168 0.0144 0.0246 0.0112
REL Residential loans/Total loans 0.3619 0.2532 0.4501 0.1438
COL Commercial loans/Total loans 0.0271 0.0436 0.0309 0.0356
MEM Number of members 12548.21 19385.81 10255.71 15501.45
Notes: Inputs and outputs in thousands of Australian dollars. PTE and SCE are DEA-based measures of 
efficiency specified as explanatory variables in the second-stage regression. The means and standard 
deviations are calculated using pooled data. 
The next two variables relate to additional non-financial characteristics of Australian credit 
unions. The first variable is intended to account for the effect of the number of credit union 
members (MEM) on efficiency. All other things being equal, a credit union with a large 
number of members will have a more diversified membership than one with a smaller 
membership. Generally this would imply that the prospects for attaining an efficient scale of 
operations are higher (Fried et al., 1993). Similarly, credit unions with a large number of 
members are more likely to actively engage in the technological innovation associated with 
deregulation. Both hypotheses suggest a positive coefficient for credit union membership 
when used as an explanatory variable for technical and scale efficiency. Alternatively, credit 
 14 
unions with a small (and presumably homogeneous and concentrated) membership may be 
able to direct greater effort at enhancing technical efficiency and technological innovation 
than those credit unions with a larger (more heterogeneous and widely spread) membership. 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and Fried et al. (1996), amongst others, have argued that the 
interaction between the number of members/accountholders and total deposits/loans is more 
important in determining efficiency than the absolute value of these variables. Thus, a low 
membership (with a high average deposit/loan account) may indicate ex ante a negative 
coefficient.  
The final explanatory variable MRG is of primary interest to the study and indicates 
whether the credit union in question is a ‘merged’ institution: that is, it merged in the period 
1993 to 1995. There is a small body of literature that examines merger-related efficiency 
gains in financial institutions. For example, Shaffer (1993) found little effect on efficiency 
resulting from scale effects, but identified that merger-related gains in technical efficiency 
were possible. Alternatively, Garden and Ralston (1999) found that a similar variable used to 
distinguish between efficiency changes in merged institutions was invariably insignificant. In 
a very different analysis, Fried et al. (1999) examined service provision in post-merger credit 
unions and compared it to service provision in pre-merger institutions.  While that study does 
comment on post-merger outcomes, it is largely concerned with contrasting the changes in 
operating efficiencies between acquired and acquiring credit unions. No efficiency 
comparison is made with non-merging credit unions. Nevertheless, a positive coefficient is 
hypothesised when efficiency is regressed against a dummy variable indicating a merged 
institution. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In the previous section, we formulated models of the determinants of M&A activity in 
Australian credit unions over the period 1993 to 1995 and factors explaining the pattern of 
post-merger efficiency in these same institutions over the period 1996 to 1997. The set of 
explanatory variables in the first instance included a measure of pure technical efficiency as a 
proxy for managerial ability, and an identical measure plus a measure of scale efficiency were 
employed as dependent variables in the second instance. The results for the probit model used 
to examine the determinants of M&A activity in credit unions are presented in Table 3 and 
the estimated tobit regressions used to examine post-merger efficiency are detailed in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Determinants of credit union mergers (1993–1995) 
 Acquiring credit unions Acquired credit unions 
 Original specification Refined specification Original specification Refined specification 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
CONS. -0.4164 2.1663 -0.6478 2.1364 -3.2790 1.9117 -0.1247 0.1701
CAP -0.4434 2.1608  0.6128 1.6196   
DDX 5.5274 5.1129 4.5982 5.0022 0.1123 2.4802 -0.0603 0.0464
HRF -1.6419** 0.6783 -1.7704*** 0.6541 0.6145 0.5744 0.0551 0.0470
PTE 2.1316* 1.2330 2.1229* 1.2098 1.0202 1.8747 0.1932 0.1743
NIL 8.5772* 4.6550 8.3208* 4.5183 3.8241 2.6717 0.0602 0.0464
TEX -2.6853** 1.0684 -2.7166*** 1.0511 -1.1423 0.9241 -0.0946 0.0822
CDP -0.2169 0.5968  0.1409 0.3840   
LIQ -0.9725 1.1890  0.2197 0.6723   
AST 0.7055*** 0.1955 0.7395*** 0.1891 -0.4298*** 0.1659 -0.0515*** 0.0126
COM 0.0411 0.1728 0.0941 0.1770  
ρ 0.1830 0.2823 0.1943 0.2731 0.2733 0.52917 0.23603 0.50417 
lnL -143.5804  -144.0931 -147.8867 -148.2024 
lnL(0) -164.4037  -164.4037 -176.5515 -176.5515 
LR 41.6466 0.0000 40.6212 0.0000 57.32946 0.0000 56.6981 0.0000
Notes: Asterisks indicate level of significance at the * .10, ** .05 and *** .01 level; lnL – log-likelihood; 
lnL(0) – restricted slopes log-likelihood; LR – likelihood ratio statistic; significance of estimate of ρ
indicates evidence of random effects in data. In the unbalanced panel of data there are 917 observations 
(323 in 1993, 304 in 1994 and 290 in 1995).  
The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the pre-merger parameters detailed in (1) 
are presented in Tables 3. Also included in Table 3 are statistics for likelihood ratio tests. The 
level of significance of ρ (p-value = 0.5168) indicates that the data is inconsistent with a 
random effects model and thus a basic probit model is employed. The results of two separate 
regression models for both acquiring and acquired credit unions are detailed. The first model 
includes all variables as specified. The second set of results re-estimates the model following 
tests of joint insignificance across the various dimensions of firm performance and risk. In the 
refined regressions for both acquiring and acquired credit unions, the variables CAP, LIQ, 
CDP and COM are tested for joint significance and are excluded from the model [W = 0.31 ∼ 
χ2(4)]. This result would appear to be sensible in that these variables are exogenously imposed 
via regulation and do not appear to vary significantly across acquired/acquiring and merged 
credit unions. Each of the remaining variables are tested on this basis, though fail to be 
excluded from the final specification. In the both the final and refined specification for 
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acquiring and acquired credit unions LR tests reject the null hypothesis that all the slope 
coefficients are jointly zero at the .01 level.  
To start with, in the case of the probability of a credit union acquiring in 1993–1995, the 
coefficients relating to loan portfolio diversification (HRF), managerial ability (PTE), net 
interest income (NIL), total expense (TEX) and total assets (AST) are significant. The results 
indicate that the more pure technically efficient (PTE) a credit union (that is, the higher the 
level of managerial ability), and the higher the level of assets (AST) and interest earnings 
(NIL) the more likely it will acquire another credit union. Also, the less diversified the loan 
portfolio (HRF) and the higher the expense ratio (TEX) the less likely it will acquire. In terms 
of the signs on the estimated coefficients and the levels of significance the results of the 
refined specification for acquiring credit unions does not appear to vary from the full 
specification. Thompson (1997) likewise found that earnings and asset quality was significant 
in determining merger status in UK mutuals, while Ralston (1998) linked capital structure, 
asset quality and earnings with the likelihood of regulatory intervention vis-à-vis financial 
distress. Alternatively, Brown et al. (1999, p. 15) concluded on the basis of univariate 
statistics that merging credit unions “were as efficient as the industry as a whole but included 
a number of small credit unions”. 
In sharp contrast to the regression models for acquiring credit unions, both the full and 
refined specification for the acquired credit unions indicate that a single variable, smaller 
asset size (AST), is associated with an increased probability of being acquired. That is, while 
managerial ability, earnings, asset size and portfolio characteristics play a major role in the 
probability of a firm acquiring another, the primary determinant of a credit union being 
acquired is simply that it is smaller. Fried et al. (1999) also found that many factors 
associated with performance are likely to vary between acquiring and acquired credit unions. 
In terms of pure technical efficiency, there appears to be no significant difference between 
acquired and non-acquired credit unions, only that acquiring credit unions are generally more 
efficient than either group. These results then appear consistent with the surveyed evidence of 
Berger et al. (1999, p. 145) such that “…in a substantial proportion of M&As, a larger, more 
efficient institution tends to take over a smaller, less efficient institution, presumably at least 
in part to spread the expertise or operating policies and procedures of the more efficient 
institution over additional resources”.  
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Table 4. Determinants of post-merger 
efficiency 1996–1997 
 Pure technical 
efficiency 
Scale  
efficiency 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
CONS. 0.9399*** 0.0082 0.9449*** 0.0101
MRG 0.1027*** 0.0098 0.0457*** 0.0121
NNT 0.0681** 0.0354 -0.0279 0.0434
INF 0.4258*** 0.1004 0.2533** 0.1232
MKT 0.0435 0.2302 1.9793*** 0.2825
REL 0.0426*** 0.0136 0.0442*** 0.0167
COL 0.1313* 0.0765 0.4437*** 0.0939
MEM 0.2490 0.1654 0.2795 0.2030
lnL 668.5590 555.0293
lnL(0) 645.5172 500.3015
LR 6.7700 0.0000 17.0400 0.0000
Notes: Asterisks indicate level of significance at the * .10, 
** .05 and *** .01 level; lnL – log-likelihood; lnL(0) –
restricted slopes log-likelihood; LR – likelihood ratio 
statistic. In the unbalanced panel of data there are 554 
observations (283 in 1996 and 271 in 1997). 
The second part of the analysis involves regressing post-merger efficiency (pure technical 
and scale) on a set of explanatory variables for the period 1996 to 1997. Berger et al. (1999, 
p. 145) highlight the basic hypothesis from surveyed evidence, “large X-efficiency gains are 
possible if the best-practice banks merge and reform the practices of the least efficient banks”. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. The first two columns are the normalised 
coefficients and standard errors of the regression of pure technical efficiency  (PTE) scores on 
the set of financial and institutional characteristics presumed to account for efficiency 
differences. The second two columns repeat this information, though where the dependent 
variable is specified as scale efficiency (SCE).  
Turning first to the model including pure technical efficiency, the ratio of non-interest 
income to total income (NNT) the proportion of total expenses made on information 
technology (INF), and the proportion of real estate (REL) and commercial (COL) loans are 
significant. The signs on these coefficients all conform to their hypothesised signs. A test of 
the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are zero fails to be rejected at the 0.01 percent 
level using the likelihood ratio procedure (LR = 6.77 ∼ χ2(7)) and we may conclude that the 
analysis adequately models the pattern of efficiency in Australian credit unions. The 
suggestion is that credit unions with a higher proportion of real estate and commercial loans, a 
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higher level of non-interest income and higher expenditure on information technology are 
more pure technically efficient. However, the primary focus for this analysis is on the 
improvements in efficiency flowing from credit union mergers. The coefficient on the dummy 
variable for merged credit unions (MRG) is significant and positive, suggesting that pure 
technical efficiency is higher for these institutions than the industry as a whole in the post-
merger period. Shaffer (1993), amongst other, also found that mergers provide technical 
efficiency gains, though in a study of Australian credit unions Garden and Ralston (1999) 
concluded that credit union mergers did not result in an increase in post-merger efficiency 
relative to other credit unions.  
The next two columns in Table 4 present the results of a similar tobit model where scale 
efficiency is specified as the dependent variable. Once again the model is highly significant 
with a LR test of the restriction that all the slope coefficients are jointly zero rejected at the 
.01 level [LR = 17.04 ∼ χ2(7)]. Of the variables selected to proxy operational characteristics, 
the level of non-interest revenue (NNT), information technology (INF) and marketing and 
promotion expense (MKT), and real estate (REL) and commercial loans orientation (COL) are 
significant and conform to the hypothesised signs. These are substantially the same as that 
found in the regression on pure technical efficiency, though the estimated coefficient on 
marketing expense is not significant in that instance. The sign on merger status (MRG) is 
positive and significant at the .01 level, suggesting that merged credit unions are also more 
scale efficient. A Wald statistic [W = 9.03 ∼ χ2(2)] confirms the joint significance of the 
characteristics of the loan portfolio (REL and COL) on scale efficiency.  
CONCLUSION 
The present study uses discrete choice regression models to investigate the influence of 
financial, managerial and regulatory factors on the probability of a credit union merging 
during the period 1993–1995, and limited dependent variable techniques to examine whether 
efficiency has increased in these same institutions in the post-merger period 1996–1997. The 
current paper extends empirical work in this area in at least two ways. First, and as far as the 
author is aware, it represents the first attempt to test these purported factors in the Australian 
institutional milieu. While a select literature has examined the pattern of efficiency in merged 
credit unions, no paper to date has attempted to link efficiency and M&A activity in the first 
instance. This is an important advance and follows Berger’s et al. (1999) suggestion that 
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future research should evaluate the consequences of consolidation by comparing the 
behaviour of financial institutions before and after M&As. Second, the paper also 
incorporates allowance for cross-sectional and time-series variation in M&As and efficiency 
effects through the use of panel data.  This allows the more thorough investigation of these 
effects across the scope of an entire industry sub-group and across a sizeable number of time 
periods.  
Interestingly, while the results suggest that the merger process is being led by high 
performing credit unions, it would seem that the acquired credit unions, at least in terms of 
pure technical efficiency, are no less efficient than the industry average. The most important 
determinant of a credit union being acquired in the Australian case is simply that it is smaller 
(in terms of asset size). In terms of outcomes, credit union M&As appear to have improved 
the level of efficiency in the merged institutions, even after several other factors often 
associated with differences in efficiency are included. Most importantly, it would seem that 
the merger process in Australia reflects the reorientation of credit union services towards 
performance in a conventional banking sense. In this manner, a comparable mechanism to 
that provided by the market for corporate control in the joint stock sector is working to 
eliminate smaller and relatively inefficient credit unions and transferring their assets to larger 
and relatively efficient institutions within the sector.  
However, the measures of efficiency calculated should be treated with caution. Put simply, 
as relative measures they tell much about the efficiency of groups of credit unions, but 
nothing about the efficiency change of the industry as a whole vis-à-vis other deposit-taking 
institutions, such as banks and building societies. That is, it is not possible to conclude that 
the efficiency of the credit union industry as a whole has improved as a result of M&A 
activity, only that the efficiency of the merged entities has improved relative to non-merged 
entities in that industry. This limitation highlights a possible area of future research. That is, 
similar techniques to the present study could be used to analyse the determinants of merger 
activity and merger-related outcomes in related industry sectors, such as building societies, 
life insurance companies and commercial banks. Likewise, an attempt could be made 
encompass the broad range of deposit-taking institutions, including banks, building societies 
and credit unions, in a single study. This may serve to highlight additional issues of concern 
to policy-makers and other interested parties. 
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NOTES 
1. This paper uses the term ‘merger’ to characterise the incorporation of the assets of a credit union into an 
existing economic entity. Though this term is consistent with the literature, it is qualified in the context of 
cooperative societies (such as building societies and credit unions), and does not distinguish between the 
voluntary and involuntary transfer of arrangements (forced merger).  
2. Brown et. al. (1999) have presented anecdotal evidence indicating that some credit unions may choose to 
exit (via merger) rather than face an expected increase in regulation-related fixed costs. These fixed costs 
may include the costs of complying with the extensive prudential regulations introduced by AFIC in 1992 
as well as the costs of acquiring and implementing new software and information systems.  
3. The data used in the analysis follows Australian accounting convention by being based on the financial year 
1 July to 30 June as against the calendar year. As an example, the year denoted 1996 in the study 
corresponds to the financial year ending 30 June 1996. 
4. In the only comparable Australian study, Garden and Ralston (1999) also examine the efficiency effects of 
credit union mergers. However, in that study only mergers in the 1994 financial year are examined, with no 
analysis made of the role of efficiency as a determinant of M&A activity, nor any distinction between 
acquiring and acquired credit unions   
5. The final set of independent variables was drawn from eleven key ratios used by the regulatory agency plus 
another twelve suggested by previous studies. 
6. At least four different approaches have been employed in the analysis of financial institution efficiency, all 
of which differ in the assumptions placed on the probability distributions of the X-efficiency differences 
and unrelated random errors (Berger et al., 1993). These are: the econometric frontier approach; the thick 
frontier approach; the distribution-free approach; and the current data envelopment analysis or DEA 
approach. 
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